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Abstract Duverger’s Law states that plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system.
We study the game-theoretic foundations of this law in a spatial model of party for-
mation and electoral competition. The standard spatial model assumes a linear agenda
space. However, when voters vote sincerely, electoral competition on the line under
plurality rule gravitates towards a single party located at the median. We therefore
depart from the linear space and instead adopt the unit circle as the space of agendas.
We characterize pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibria under both sincere
and strategic voting. Under both voting behaviors, multiple configurations of par-
ties are possible in equilibrium. We refine our predictions using a new notion called
defection-proof (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium. Under sincere voting, either two
or three parties are effective in defection-proof Nash equilibria, whereas under strate-
gic voting, either one or two parties are effective in defection-proof subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria. These results are partially consistent with Duverger’s Law.
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“Extremism is so easy. You’ve got your position, and that’s it. It doesn’t take much thought. And when you
go far enough to the right you meet the same idiots coming around from the left.”
—Clint Eastwood, Time Magazine, February 20, 2005
1 Introduction
In democratic societies, collective decisions are made in legislatures. Legislators are
often grouped into parties. Party representation and configuration in turn depend on the
political framework (cf. Rae 1971; Lijphart 1990; Taagepera and Shugart 1989) and the
particular strategies adopted by politicians, parties and voters within that framework.
Duverger’s Law states that plurality voting in single member districts tends to favor a
two-party system (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982). Theoretical support for this law has
been provided in Cox (1987), Palfrey (1989), Feddersen (1992) and Fey (1997) by
assuming strategic voters who avoid wasting their vote on “hopeless” candidates and
in Rivière (1998) and Osborne and Tourky (2008) by assuming economies of party
size. Fey (2007) finds support for the law in a setting with sincere voters and pure
policy-motivated candidates when the available policies are the corner points of the
unit square.1 In this paper, we aim to contribute to the game-theoretic foundation of
Duverger’s Law.
The theoretical literature on political party formation and configuration typically
builds on the Downsian model of electoral competition, which assumes voters to be
distributed along a line segment representing the agenda space (Downs 1957a). We
believe that the linear model of electoral competition is not suitable for this research
as the incentives to attract the median voter easily generate a single party in the
pluralistic system under sincere voting when we consider equilibrium refinements
that allow movements at the party level (see Sect. 5). This motivates our point of
departure from the standard framework: We instead assume that the set of agendas
equals the unit circle. We hereby follow in the success of the industrial organization
literature in studying multi-firm competition by moving from Hotelling’s linear city
(Hotelling 1929) to Salop’s circular city (Salop 1979).2
Before continuing, we believe some justification for using the circle as the agenda
space is needed and we provide two views we believe are better captured by the circle
than by the line.3
First, in political science, the horseshoe theory stipulates that parties usually
depicted as far-left and far-right are more similar to each other in essentials than either
are to the political center, and hence the political spectrum is better represented by a
horseshoe than with a linear bar.4 For instance, both extremes typically disapprove of
1 Other papers that explain the existence of parties, without particularly focusing on Duverger’s prediction,
include Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Jackson and Moselle (2002), Snyder and
Ting (2002), Levy (2004) and Morelli (2004).
2 According to Persson andTabellini (2000, p. 5), “It is hard tomodel the outcome ofmultiparty competition
...”. As we will see, the transition to a circular agenda space may be a step forward.
3 The circular agenda space can also arise as a social compromise while drawing a constitution. See the
online supplement at https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8Sv4TBdx30JQ1hocW5qU0lOYjQ.
4 This theory is attributed to the French post-postmodernist philosopher Jean–Pierre Faye. See Faye (1973).
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immigration: Labor unions because aliens take their jobs and strong nationalists view
aliens as a threat to the native culture. They also share a similar distaste for foreign
aid: Extreme left because foreign aid usually ends up in the hands of corrupt elites and
bolsters pro-market policies and extreme right because it bolsters inefficient public
sector. A prime example for a country where the left and right extreme parties can
be considered to be competing for the same voters is the Netherlands. Parties that are
usually considered extreme right (PVV) and left (SP) both have a nationalistic focus
concerning geopolitical issues and plea for increasing investments in public health
and security, lowering bureaucracy and taxes for households, small-scale education
and cutting budgets for defense and the royal family. According to the Dutch political
barometer of 22 October 2015 by Ipsos, 19.3 % of the voters that voted for the SP in
the latest elections indicated that they intend to vote for the PVV in the next elections.5
Second, even when extreme ideological positions do not coincide, the literature on
political psychology tells us that right and left wing extremists (including radicals,
reactionists, fundamentalists and fanatics) have similarities in their cognitive styles,
the ways of engaging with political opposition, and the means of achieving their goals
(cf. McClosky and Chong 1985; Brandt et al. 2015).
The summary description of our model is as follows. There are a finite number of
politicians that simultaneously and independently choose to promote agendas in the
elections, where the set of agendas is the unit circle. Politicians promoting the same
agenda form a party. Hence, the party structure follows directly from the politicians’
decisions to promote agendas.We assume that the voters are uniformly distributed over
the unit circle, with each voter’s most preferred agenda coinciding with her location on
the circle. We consider both the situation where voters are assumed to vote sincerely
(i.e., support the party closest to their most preferred agendas) and to vote strategically.
Next, the pluralitarian electoral system assigns all power to the parties with the highest
vote share (winner takes all). We assume that the politicians belonging to a party share
equally in its power, and each politician is opportunistic (office-motivated), trying to
maximize her individual power. Hence, in general, each politician prefers to become
a member of a party with a high vote share but as few other members as possible.
We provide a full characterization of the sets of pure-strategy (subgame-perfect)
Nash equilibria in both the case of sincere and strategic voting, and show that these sets
are nonempty. Typically, both situations possess a rich set of equilibria.6 Therefore, we
define notions of defection-proofness to refine the Nash predictions. This refinement
is similar in motivation to coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al. 1987)
but only allows for particular deviations, which we call defections.7 The defections
5 The Ipsos survey is available at http://www.ipsos-nederland.nl/ipsos-politieke-barometer/winst-en-
verlies.
6 A high multiplicity of (types of) equilibria is also found in a two-stage location-quantity game along the
circle’s circumference in Gupta et al. (2004).
7 A characterization of the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) under plurality rule is technically
challenging as CPNE allows for too many coalitional deviations, some of which we regard implausible (i.e.,
deviations for which we did not find any empirical support) in the present context. Our notion of defection-
proof Nash equilibrium aims to implement the notion of CPNEwhile restricting coalitional deviations to the
plausible ones. We believe the normative appeal of our selection concept may apply to (mis)coordination
games in general, but are not surewhether it predicts and selects for all types of (mis)coordination games. The
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include deviations by a coalition of politicians that are typically observed in reality;
for instance, shifts in agenda, mergers of parties, and a set of politicians splitting from
their original parties and forming a new party or joining an existing one.8 For the
situation with strategic voters, we also consider defections by voters, which involves
a coalition of voters agreeing to vote for a specific party.
We show that, in the situation with sincere voting, Nash equilibria that generate
strictly more than three parties are not defection-proof. Intuitively, sincere voting
creates incentives for parties supporting adjacent agendas to come to a compromise
by supporting an agenda that lies in the middle of their original positions. Although
such a compromise creates a larger party, this party garners a plurality of the votes
whenever there are at least four parties before this coalitional defection. Moreover,
this compromise is credible as it ensures that no defecting subcoalition can gain a
plurality. We also show that defection-proofness rules out equilibria with exactly one
party when voters are sincere. A single party equilibrium is easily undermined by a
defection by a single politician since the defecting politician garners exactly half the
votes (contrast this with the result on a line where the single party located at themedian
cannot be undermined by any defection). Thus, our defection-proof Nash equilibrium
predictions under sincere voting are only partially consistent with Duverger’s Law:
We predict either two or three parties to be effective under sincere voting.
In the situation with strategic voting, any configuration of political parties can be
supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium since voters are atomless. When
refining these predictions using our notion of defection-proofness that allows any
mass of voters to defect, we find that configurations with three or more parties do not
survive. Whenever three or more parties are equally likely to gain power, there exists
a coalition of voters located around the midpoint between any two parties who would
switch their votes to their second most preferred party—which causes that party to
win—rather than vote sincerely as these voters prefer that their second most preferred
party gains power for sure over a lottery in which parties that are even worse are likely
to gain power. We also show that defection-proof equilibria with one or two parties
exist when we restrict the defections by voters to groups of less than half of the total
electorate. Hence, our defection-proof predictions under strategic voting too are only
Footnote 7 continued
set of defection-proof Nash equilibria includes the set of strong Nash equilibria (Aumann 1959). However,
a priori, there is no logical relation between CPNE and defection-proof Nash equilibria. A defection-proof
Nash equilibrium is immune to self-enforcing or credible defections by any coalition (i.e., defections from
which there are no further credible defections by any subcoalition). On the other hand, a CPNE is immune
to credible deviations by any coalition (i.e., deviations from which there are no further credible deviations
by any subcoalition). The set of possible defections by a coalition is a subset of the set of deviations by that
coalition. Nevertheless, the set of credible defections by a coalition is not necessarily a subset or superset
of the set of credible deviations.
8 Duverger already reasoned that the field of parties is trimmed to just two by the forces of “fusion” and
elimination (cf. Fey 1997). According to Kaminski (2006), “party politics revolves around the emergence
of new parties [and] electoral splits and coalitions.” In Eguia (2013), the stability of a party configuration or
voting bloc in an assembly is defined with respect to immunity of the current configuration against fourteen
classes of deviations. Our definition of defections includes twelve of these classes—exception being classes
D1 and D3 in which a subset of politicians deviate to become independents or singleton parties. Hence,
considering only defections does not seem to be too restrictive.
123
Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger’s Law 733
partially consistent with Duverger’s Law: We predict either one or two parties to be
effective under strategic voting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model and defini-
tions in Sect. 2. Sections 3 and 4 present the results for sincere and strategic voting,
respectively. We compare our results to those of the linear agenda space in Sect. 5.
Section 6 summarizes our results. Proofs for sincere and strategic voting are collected
in Appendices 7 and 8, respectively.
2 Model and definitions
There is a finite set of politicians I with |I | ≥ 3.9 The set of agendas A is the circum-
ference of a circle of unit length. An agenda is denoted by a. Voters are uniformly
distributed on A.10 We identity each voter by her location on A.
There are two stages in our model:
Stage I: The I politicians simultaneously choose to support agendas on the circle.
We restrict attention to pure strategies. Therefore, A is the set of strategies
for each politician. The politicians’ strategy profile is denoted by s. For any
J ⊆ I , sJ denotes the strategy profile (si )i∈J and s−J denotes the strategy
profile (si )i∈I\J .
The politicians’ strategy profile s defines a partition P(s) of the set of politicians,
where each P ∈ P(s) is such that for some agenda a, si = a for all i ∈ P and s j = a
for all j /∈ P . That is, every politician who belongs to P supports the same agenda a
in the profile s and none of the politicians outside P support the agenda a. We will
refer to any P ∈ P(s) as a party. Hence, P(s) is the set of all parties formed under
the politicians’ strategy profile s. The agenda supported by a party P ∈ P(s) is the
unique agenda supported by every politician who belongs to P .
Stage II: Let s be the politicians’ strategy profile in Stage I and P(s) be the resulting
set of political parties formed under s. In Stage II, each voter casts her vote
for one of the parties inP(s).We assume that all voters play pure strategies.
Hence, the voters’ strategy profile is a mapping vs : A → P(s) such that
the voter located at agenda a votes for the political party vs(a). We restrict
attention to strategy profiles vs that are Lebesgue measurable.
Given s in Stage I and vs in Stage II, the weight wP (s, vs) of a party P ∈ P(s) is
the measure of voters who vote for party P under the voters’ strategy profile vs .
Note that wP (s, vs) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P(s) and ∑P∈P(s) wP (s, vs) = 1. Thus,
w(s, vs) =
(
wP (s, vs)
)
P∈P(s) is the resulting distribution of weights over parties
in P(s).
9 |X | is the cardinality of set X .
10 We can easily relax this assumption and allow for a wider set of distributions of the voters over the
circle: As long as any interval on the circle can be split in two such that the mass on this interval is equally
divided, we obtain qualitatively similar results. Likewise, our results generalize to any agenda space that is
homeomorphic to a circle over which voters are uniformly distributed.
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A voting rule ρ defines for each strategy profile (s, vs) the power ρP (w(s, vs))
of each party P ∈ P(s) as a function of the distribution of weights w(s, vs). In this
paper, we restrict attention to the plurality rule 11 so that all parties with the maximum
weight share power equally whereas any party with less than the maximum weight
gets zero power. Formally, for any (s, vs), the plurality rule defines the power of any
P ∈ P(s) as
ρP (w(s, vs)) ≡
{
1
| argmaxP ′∈P(s) wP ′ (s,vs )| , if P ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s)wP ′(s, vs)
0, otherwise.
For any strategy profile (s, vs), we say that a party P ∈ P(s) is effective under vs if
it has positive power, i.e., ρP (w(s, vs)) > 0.
We assume that the politicians belonging to a party share equally in its power.
Furthermore, politicians receive utility equal to their individual power – such office-
motivated politicians are standard in the literature (cf. Downs 1957b). Hence, the
utility of politician i under the strategy profile (s, vs) is ui (s, vs) = ρP (w(s,vs ))|P| , where
i ∈ P ∈ P(s).12
Let u(a′; a) denote the utility of the voter located at a when there is a single
effective party that supports agenda a′. We assume that u is a continuous function in
both arguments and u(a′; a) < u(a′′; a) if and only if a′ is located at a greater distance
from a than a′′.13 Thus, each voter’s location on A is her most-preferred agenda and
her utility decreases continuously in the distance between her most-preferred agenda
and the agenda supported by the single effective party. If two or more parties are
effective, then we assume that the voters consider each agenda supported by these
effective parties as equally likely and evaluate the resulting lottery over agendas by its
expected utility.
In subsequent sections, wewill analyze “defection-proof” equilibria both under sin-
cere and strategic voting.Although the notion of equilibrium (Nash or subgame-perfect
Nash) differs based on the voters’ behavior (therefore, we leave these definitions until
the relevant sections), we can give general definitions for defections and credible
defections that can be applied to both sincere and strategic voting models. Our defin-
ition of defection allows for the possibility of coordinated deviation by a coalition of
players (either politicians or voters but not both).
To define defection and credible defection by politicians, suppose the voters’ behav-
ior in Stage II is given by (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | , i.e., voters vote according to the strategy profile
vs˜ in Stage II following each s˜ ∈ A|I | in Stage I.
Definition 1 (Defection by politicians) Given (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | , a defection from the politi-
cians’ strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I is a strategy profile for coalition J ,
11 See the working paper version (Peeters et al. 2010) for the proportional rule.
12 Equivalently, we can assume that (a) parties with maximumweight are equally likely to win the election,
(b) the party that ex-post wins the election obtains power of 1 which is shared equally by its members, and
(c) the politicians maximize their expected utilities.
13 The distance between two agendas is the length of the smaller arc between them.
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s′J ∈ A|J |, such that s j = s′j = a for all j ∈ J , and u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v(s′J ,s−J )
)
>
u j
(
(sJ , s−J ), v(sJ ,s−J )
)
for all j ∈ J .14
Thus, a defection by politicians is a deviation from the politicians’ strategy profile by
a coalition of politicians that satisfies two requirements: First, all the members of the
coalition deviate to the same agenda, and second, all themembers of the coalitionmust
strictly improve their utilities after the deviation. The following are some examples of
defections by politicians:
• Shift in a party’s agenda: All the politicians in a party decide to shift the agenda
supported by their party.
• Split in a party: A subset of politicians belonging to a party form a new party by
supporting a different agenda.
• Merger of parties: All the politicians in two or more parties choose to support a
new common agenda.
• A set of politicians split from their original parties and merge at a new or some
previously supported agenda.
Such defections by politicians are quite common in politics, and therefore we allow
for them in our model. However, unless binding agreements are possible among the
defecting coalition, the defection must be self-enforcing or credible.
Definition 2 (Credible defection by politicians) Given Stage II strategies (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | :
(i) A credible defection from the politicians’ strategy profile s by a politician j ∈ I
is a s′j ∈ A such that s′j is a defection from s by politician j .
(ii) A credible defection from the politicians’ strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I
such that |J | > 1 is a strategy profile for coalition J , s′J ∈ A|J |, such that s′J is a
defection from s by coalition J and there does not exist any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J
with a credible defection from (s′J , s−J ).
Thus, a credible defection by a coalition of politicians is such that no further credible
defection is possible by any proper subcoalition of politicians.15 We similarly define
defection and credible defection by voters.
14 It is standard to assume that while contemplating a deviation, a coalition considers the strategy of the
complement as fixed. One could imagine a stronger notion of defection which requires that in case the
defecting coalition of politicians chooses an agenda that is already supported by another party, then the
politicians in the latter party should also be better-off. The resulting notion of defection-proofness can
easily be shown to make precisely the same selection among (a) Nash equilibria under sincere voting as in
Theorem 3 and (b) subgame-perfect Nash equilibria under strategic voting as in Theorems 5 and 6. However,
this stronger definition of defection by politicians is not consistent with Nash equilibrium. After all, in Nash
equilibrium, we consider defections by single politicians but do not care in case such a defection makes the
party that this single politician joins worse-off. Therefore, we should stick with the current weaker notion
of defection by politicians.
15 In case the defecting coalition joins another party, we might be interested in the stability of the resulting
party rather than that of the defecting coalition. For instance, suppose the coalition of politicians {1, 2, 3}
defects to join the party comprising of politicians {4, 5, 6}. Now, even though no proper subcoalition of
the original defectors {1, 2, 3} has a further credible defection, we might want to seriously consider the
possibility that some other coalition in the new party {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, which does not include all of the
original defectors {1, 2, 3}, has a credible defection. However, this possibility does not arise in our model as
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Definition 3 (Defection by voters) Consider Stage II following the politicians’ strat-
egy profile s.
(i) Let B ⊆ A be a subset of voters with a positive measure. A defection from
vs by B is a voters’ strategy profile v′s such that vs(a) = v′s(a) for all a /∈ B,
vs(a) = v′s(a) = P ∈ P(s) for all a ∈ B, and every voter in B gets greater utility
under v′s than under vs .
(ii) Pick any δ such that 0 < δ ≤ 1. A δ-defection from vs is a defection from vs by
a subset of voters B that has at most δ measure.
Thus, a defection by voters is a deviation from the voters’ strategy profile by a coalition
of voters that has a positive measure16 which satisfies two requirements: First, all the
members of the coalition deviate to vote for the sameparty, and second, all themembers
of the coalition must strictly improve their utilities after the deviation. The notion of
δ-defection by voters restricts attention to those defections by voters in which the size
of the defecting coalition of voters is bounded by δ.
Definition 4 (Credible defection by voters) Consider Stage II following the politi-
cians’ strategy profile s.
(i) Let B ⊆ A be a subset of voters with a positive measure. A credible defection
from vs by B is a voters’ strategy profile v′s such that v′s is a defection from vs by
B and there does not exist a subset of voters C ⊂ B such that C has a positive
but smaller measure than B and there is a credible defection from v′s by C .17
(ii) A credible δ-defection from vs is a credible defection from vs by a subset of
voters B that has at most δ measure.
Thus, a credible defection by a coalition of voters is such that no further credible
defection is possible by any proper subcoalition of voters. The notion of credible δ-
defection by voters restricts attention to those credible defections by voters in which
the size of the defecting coalition of voters is bounded by δ.
Footnote 15 continued
long as voters’ strategies does not depend on the identities of the defecting politicians (e.g., sincere voting).
In our model, all politicians in a party share equally in its power. Hence, if there does not exist a credible
defection by a proper subcoalition of {1, 2, 3}, then there does not exist a credible defection by any single
politician in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, which in turn implies that there does not exist a defection by any proper subset
of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Indeed, all our results on defection-proofness (Theorems 3, 5 and 6) remain unaltered.
16 Of course, defections by a coalition of voters with zero measure will not change the outcome.
17 The reason why credible defection by voters is well-defined is because given any voters’ strategy profile
v0s , it is impossible to find a nested sequence of sets of positive measures A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃ A3 . . . and corre-
sponding sequence of profiles (v1s , v
2
s , v
3
s , . . .) such that v
k
s is a defection from v
k−1
s by Ak for all k ≥ 1.
That is, there must exist a K such that there is no defection from vKs by any measurable C ⊂ AK , and
so vKs is a credible defection from v
K−1
s by AK . To see this, suppose there exist such a nested sequence
of voters and corresponding sequence of voters’ strategy profiles. Then by the definition of defection by
voters, all voters in Ak strictly prefer the outcome (i.e., the combination of effective parties) in v
k
s to the
outcome in vk
′
s for all k
′ < k. As s is fixed, there is a finite number of possible outcomes, and hence, at
some point along the sequence, say at K + 1, we must obtain one of the outcomes that was observed before
in the sequence. But that immediately implies that vK+1s is not a defection from vKs by AK+1 because the
voters in AK+1 do not strictly prefer the outcome in vK+1s to all the outcomes observed before.
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Fig. 1 The dotted lines
demarcate arcs that define the
distance between adjacent
parties. The thick lines
demarcate arcs that define each
party’s voter base or weight
under sincere voting. The weight
of a party under sincere voting is
the average of its left and right
distances
Ls(P )
P
Rs(P )
3 Sincere voting
In this section, we assume that each voter votes sincerely in Stage II for the party
supporting the agenda nearest to her most-preferred agenda; in case there are two such
parties, the indifferent voter votes for one of them using some tie-breaking rule.18
Let s be the politicians’ strategy profile in Stage I. We denote the voters’ sincere
strategy profile by v∗s . For any P ∈ P(s), let Rs(P) be the first party that is sup-
porting an agenda in the clockwise direction starting at the agenda supported by P .
Similarly, let Ls(P) be the first party that is supporting an agenda in the counterclock-
wise direction starting at the agenda supported by P . Any two parties P, P ′ ∈ P(s)
are adjacent if P ′ ∈ {Ls(P), Rs(P)}. We term the length of the arc between the
agenda supported by P and agenda supported by Ls(P) as the left distance of party
P and denote it by ls(P). Similarly, the length of the arc between the agenda sup-
ported by P and agenda supported by Rs(P) will be called the right distance of party
P and denoted by rs(P). The distance between two parties is the minimum of the
two.
As voters are assumed to vote sincerely, the weight of a party P ∈ P(s) is equal to
half of the sum of its left and right distances: wP (s, v∗s ) = l
s (P)+rs (P)
2 (see Fig. 1).
3.1 Nash equilibrium
Since the voters vote sincerely in Stage II, we have to only analyze the strategic
interaction among the politicians in Stage I. To this end, we first study the Nash
equilibria of the Stage I game amongst the politicians under the assumption of sincere
voting in Stage II.
Definition 5 (Nash equilibrium under sincere voting) The politicians’ strategy profile
s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting if there do not exist i ∈ I and s′i ∈ A
such that ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
> ui
(
(si , s−i ), v∗(si ,s−i )
)
.
18 Since each voter has zero measure, all tie-breaking rules (e.g., vote for the nearest party in the clockwise
direction, vote for the nearest party in the counterclockwise direction, or vote for both of these parties with
equal probability) will result in the same outcome. Also, note that a voter can never be indifferent between
more than two parties since the set of agendas is a circle.
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Thus, a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting is stable against unilateral deviations
by a single politician.
The next theorem characterizes the set of Nash equilibria under sincere voting:
Theorem 1 The politicians strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere
voting if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties in P(s) differ by at
most 1, and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and the distance between the parties is more than 13 .
(ii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ |I |2 and all parties have equal weight.
(iii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 4, |P(s)| > |I |2 and all parties are equidistant from each other.
(iv) 5 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 6, |P(s)| > |I |2 , all parties are equidistant from each other, and
there does not exist any pair of singleton parties that are adjacent.
Thus, whether s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting or not depends only on
two factors: First, the respective distances between the agendas supported in s—
which determine the weights of the parties—and second, the numbers of politicians
in the parties formed in s. Hence, if s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting,
then the strategy profile s′ obtained by either shifting the agendas supported by all
politicians by a fixed constant or permuting the identities of the politicians will also be
a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting. This is obviously because of the particular
specification of the utilities of the politicians.
An important property of the Nash equilibrium under sincere voting is that all
parties formed in equilibrium have equal weight (Lemma 7). This is because only
those parties with the maximum weight obtain positive power. Hence, if a party has
less than the maximum weight, then a politician belonging to that party obtains zero
utility but could obtain positive utility by deviating to an agenda supported by some
party (more precisely, any party with the highest weight in the hypothetical situation
in which the set of politicians is I\{i}, where i is the deviating politician, and these
politicians choose agendas according to the strategy profile s−i ).
As the weight of a party is the average of its left and right distances, the above
mentioned property (Lemma 7) implies that the sums of the left and right distances of
all parties formed in equilibrium are equal. Since the right (left) distance of party Pk
is trivially equal to the left (right) distance of Rs(Pk) (Ls(Pk)), it follows that the left
(right) distance of a party Pk equals the right (left) distance of party Rs(Pk) (Ls(Pk)).
Therefore, if {P1, . . . , Pn} is the set of parties that form in Nash equilibrium under
sincere voting and,without loss of generality, Pk+1 = Rs(Pk) for all k = 1, . . . , n−1,
then we obtain the following two sequences of equalities:
ls(P1) = rs(P2) = ls(P3) = rs(P4) = · · ·
ls(Pn) = rs(P1) = ls(P2) = rs(P3) = · · · (1)
In words, if we move along the circle in the clockwise direction, then every other arc
defined by the set of agendas supported in equilibrium has the same length.
The property that all parties have equalweight in equilibriumgenerates two possible
configurations of parties in equilibrium:
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Fig. 2 Odd number (> 1) of
parties under sincere voting: (1)
All parties have equal weight
and are equidistant. (2) The
locations of the parties are the
vertices of a convex regular
polygon
P 1
P 2
P 3P 4
P 5
(1)
P 1
P 2
P 3P 4
P 5
(2)
(i) An odd number of parties form in equilibrium. Then all partiesmust be equidistant
from each other. To see this, suppose n = 5, i.e., five parties P1, . . . , P5 form in
equilibrium (see Fig. 2(1)). Using (1), we obtain
ls(P1)=rs(P2)= ls(P3)=rs(P4)= ls(P5)=rs(P1)= ls(P2)
=rs(P3)= ls(P4)=rs(P5).
Since the parties are equidistant, the set of agendas supported in equilibrium s can
be graphically visualized as the vertices of a n-sided convex regular polygon (as
shown in Fig. 2(2)).
(ii) An even number of parties form in equilibrium. First, consider the case whenmore
than two parties form. Then both equidistant and non-equidistant configurations
are possible. Figure 3 shows these configurations with six parties. In general, we
can graphically visualize the set of agendas supported in equilibrium as follows.
Since all parties have equal weight, we have
ls(P2) + rs(P2) = ls(P4) + rs(P4) = ls(P6) + rs(P6) = · · ·
But ls(P2)+ rs(P2) is the distance between the agendas supported by parties P1
and P3; ls(P4)+rs(P4) is the distance between the agendas supported by parties
P3 and P5 and so on.Hence, all odd-numbered parties (P1, P3, . . . , Pn−3, Pn−1)
are equidistant from each other, and thus the agendas supported by these parties are
vertices of an n2 -sided convex regular polygon (as shown in Fig. 4(2)). Similarly, all
even-numbered parties (P2, P4, . . . , Pn−2, Pn) are equidistant from each other
and the agendas supported by these parties are also vertices of an n2 -sided convex
regular polygon (as shown in Fig. 4(2)). If in addition, all parties are equidistant
from each other, then the agendas supported by all parties are vertices of a n-sided
convex regular polygon (as shown in Fig. 4(1)).
When only two parties form in equilibrium, each party has a weight of 12 . In
this case, it must be that the distance between the two parties is greater than
1
3 . Otherwise, a single politician from the party having the larger number of
politicians—who obtains a utility of at most 14 as she shares power of
1
2 with
at least one other politician—can deviate to the agenda in the middle of the longer
arc between the agendas supported by the two parties. The left and right distances
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Fig. 3 Even number (> 2) of
parties under sincere voting: All
parties have equal weight but
both equidistant (shown in (1))
and non-equidistant (shown in
(2)) configurations are possible.
In (2), all even-numbered parties
are equidistant from each other
and all odd-numbered parties are
equidistant from each other
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(1)
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(2)
Fig. 4 Even number (> 2) of
parties under sincere voting: (1)
When all parties are equidistant,
their locations are the vertices of
a convex regular polygon. (2)
When parties are not equidistant,
the locations of all
even-numbered/odd-numbered
parties are the vertices of a
convex regular polygon
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(1)
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(2)
of this new singleton party will be both at least 13 , and hence it will have at least
as much weight as the other two parties. Thus, the deviating politician will obtain
a utility of at least 13 , which is a contradiction.
The utility of a politician is a function both of the weight of her party and the number
of other politicians who belong to her party. Since all parties have the same weight
in equilibrium, a politician in party P obtains 1|P| proportion of the weight. If there
is another party P ′ such that |P| > |P ′| + 1, then a politician from party P could
deviate to the agenda supported by P ′, increasing her utility to 1|P ′|+1 proportion of
the weight. Therefore, the numbers of politicians in any two parties in P(s) differ by
at most 1 in equilibrium.
It also follows from Theorem 1 that the number of parties formed in Nash equi-
librium under sincere voting is bounded below by 2 and above by max{ |I |2 , 6}. Any
strategy profile in which only a single party is formed is not an equilibrium since by
deviating to any other agenda, any politician can form a singleton party with theweight
of 12 , and hence increase her utility from at most
1
3—since |I | ≥ 3—to 12 . On the other
hand, suppose the number of parties formed in equilibrium is greater than both |I |2
and 6. Figure 5(1) shows such a strategy profile of the politicians when |I | = 17 but
nine parties form. Then at least one party, say P2, is singleton and the utility of this
politician is less than 16 (see the figure). Since the numbers of politicians in any two
parties cannot differ by more than 1, both P1 = Ls(P2) and P3 = Rs(P2) have
at most two members. Without loss of generality, let rs(P2) ≤ ls(P2). If the single
politician in P2 were to deviate to the agenda supported by P3 (as shown in Fig. 5(2)),
then the weight of party P3∪ P2 will increase by ls (P2)2 and the weight of P1 by r
s (P2)
2 ,
while the weights of all other parties will stay constant as the agendas supported by
their respective adjacent parties stay fixed. Since we started with a situation of equal
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|P 1| = 2
|P 2| = 1
|P 3| = 2
|P 4| = 2
|P 5| = 2|P 6| = 2
|P 7| = 2
|P 8| = 2
|P 9| = 2
(1)
|P 1| = 2
|P 3 ∪ P 2| = 3
|P 4| = 2
|P 5| = 2|P 6| = 2
|P 7| = 2
|P 8| = 2
|P 9| = 2
(2)
Fig. 5 Under sincere voting, the number of parties is bounded above by max{ |I |2 , 6}: Assume |I | = 17. (1)
A strategy profile in which 9 parties form. (2) A unilateral deviation by the politician in P2 that increases
her utility
weights, the merged party P3∪ P2 will have themaximumweight, and hence, through
this deviation, the politician will obtain a utility of at least 16 as she shares the power
of at least 12 with at most two other members, which is a contradiction.
The following corollary immediately follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 For any |I | ≥ 3, the set of Nash equilibria under sincere voting is
nonempty.
Indeed, the model has multiple Nash equilibria under sincere voting with the number
of political parties in equilibrium ranging from 2 to max{ |I |2 , 6}. Next, we refine our
predictions using defection-proofness.
3.2 Defection-proof Nash equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium under sincere voting will not be stable if there exists a credible
defection from it by coalitions of politicians. We therefore now restrict attention to
defection-proof Nash equilibria.
Definition 6 (Defection-proof Nash equilibrium under sincere voting) The politi-
cians’ strategy profile s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium under sincere voting if
given the sincere voting strategies in Stage II (v∗s˜ )s˜∈A|I | , there is no credible defection
from s by any coalition J ⊆ I .
Defection-proof Nash equilibria under sincere voting are stable against credible defec-
tions by any coalition of politicians. Clearly, the set of defection-proof Nash equilibria
under sincere voting is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria under sincere voting.
The following theorem characterizes the set of defection-proof Nash equilibria
under sincere voting.
Theorem 3 The politicians’ strategy profile s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium
under sincere voting if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties in
P(s) differ by at most 1 and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and the distance between the parties is more than 13 .
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(ii) |P(s)| = 3 and all parties are equidistant from each other.
Thus, defection-proofness sharply refines the set of Nash equilibria under sincere
voting: Only those Nash equilibria in which either two or three parties form are
defection-proof. To seewhyNash equilibria with at least four parties are not defection-
proof, let’s consider a Nash equilibrium s in which P1, . . . , Pn parties form, where
n ≥ 4, and all parties are equidistant, with the distance equal to d (the proof takes
care of all cases). Let a be the agenda that is the midpoint of the agendas supported
by P2 and P3 (as shown in Fig. 6(1)). Now, if a coalition consisting of all politicians
in P2 and P3 were to deviate to supporting a, ceteris paribus, then n − 1 parties,
viz. {P1, P2 ∪ P3, P4, . . . , Pn}, will be formed in the resulting profile s′ (as shown
in Fig. 6(2)). The weight of the party P2 ∪ P3 will be 32d, while the weights of P1
and P4 will each be 54d, and the weights of all other parties will remain unchanged.
Since we started with a situation of equal weights, the merged party P2 ∪ P3 will be
the unique party with the maximum weight, and hence each member of the deviating
coalition will obtain a utility of 1|P2|+|P3| compared to the utility of either
1
n|P2| or
1
n|P3| in profile s. Since n ≥ 4 and the numbers of politicians in parties P2 and P3 do
not differ from each other by more than 1 – since s is a Nash equilibrium –, we have
n|P2| ≥ 4|P2| > 2|P2|+1 ≥ |P2|+|P3|, and similarly, n|P3| > |P2|+|P3|. Thus,
each member of the deviating coalition will be strictly better-off after the deviation,
and hence we have obtained a defection from s by coalition P2 ∪ P3. This defection
is in fact credible. Consider any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ P2 ∪ P3. If starting from s′, all
members of J ′ were to deviate to an agenda like a′, which lies on the arc between the
agendas supported by P1 and P4 that does not contain a (see Fig. 6(2)), then at least
as many agendas as in s′ will be supported in the resulting profile s′′. However, the
weight of party P2 ∪ P3\J ′ will not change while the weight of any other party will
be at most 54d. Hence, the subcoalition J
′ cannot improve its utility by this deviation.
On the other hand, if starting from s′, all members of J ′ were to deviate to an agenda
like a′′ or a′′′, which lie between a and the agenda supported by either P1 or P4
(see Fig. 6(2)), then the weight of party J ′ will be 34d, which is less than the weight
of P2 ∪ P3\J ′. Thus, J ′ cannot improve its utility by such a deviation. Hence, we
conclude that the initial defection from s is a credible defection.
In contrast, all Nash equilibria under sincere voting in which either two or three
parties form are defection-proof. Let’s consider a Nash equilibrium s as shown in
Fig. 7(1) with three parties, P1, P2 and P3 (the argument for two parties is similar).
First, consider a defection in which all three parties merge, resulting in s′ with a single
agenda being supported. Since s′ is not a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting,
there exists a credible defection from s′ by a single politician belonging to the initial
defecting coalition. Thus, the initial defection cannot be credible. Second, consider
a defection in which all politicians except some in say P3 merge resulting in s′ in
which two agendas are supported (as shown in Fig. 7(2)). Thus, instead of 1
3|P1| , a
defecting politician belonging to P1 obtains a utility of at most 1
2|P1|+2|P2| after the
defection. But 2|P1| + 2|P2| ≥ 2|P1| + |P2| + 1 ≥ 3|P1|, where the last inequality
follows from the fact that the numbers of politicians in parties P1 and P2 do not
differ from each other by more than 1. Thus, any politician belonging to P1 will not
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P 1
P 2
a
P 3P 4
P 5
(1)
P 1
a
a supported by P 2 ∪ P 3
a
P 4
P 5
a
(2)
Fig. 6 Under sincere voting, Nash equilibria with more than 3 parties are not defection-proof: (1) A Nash
equilibrium with 5 parties. (2) A credible defection by P2 ∪ P3
P1
P2P3
(1)
P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {j1, j2}
P3 \ {j1, j2}
(2)
P1 ∪ {j1, j2, j3}
P2 \ {j3}P3 \ {j1, j2}
(3)
P1 ∪ {j1, j2, j3}
P2 \ {j3}P3 \ {j1, j2}
(4)
Fig. 7 Under sincere voting, Nash equilibria with 3 parties are defection-proof: (1) A Nash equilibrium
with 3 parties. (2) There do not exist defections by politicians that result in only two supported agendas.
(3) and (4) show that there do not exist defections by politicians that result in three supported agendas
improve her utility through this defection, a contradiction. Third, any defection that
results in a s′ in which three agendas are supported must be such that at least two
agendas supported in s, say those of P2 and P3, are also supported in s′. That is, some
politicians belonging to P2 and P3 are not members of the defecting coalition. If the
party formed supports an agenda which is different than the agenda supported by P1
in s, then it has a weight of 13 (Fig. 7(3)) or
1
6 (Fig. 7(4)) depending on the arc on
which the agenda is placed. In both cases, there is at least one party with a weight of
strictly more than 13 . Therefore, the party formed has zero power and so the defection
is not beneficial. If the party formed supports the agenda supported by P1 in s, then
all three agendas supported in s are also supported in s′. But such a defection even by
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a single politician is not beneficial since s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting.
Finally, any defection that results in a s′ in which four agendas are supported must be
such that all three agendas supported in s are also supported in s′ (note that there does
not exist a defection that results in five or more supported agendas). But this cannot be
beneficial for the same reasoning as above. Thus there is no credible defection from s
by any coalition of politicians.
As a corollary of Theorem 3, we easily obtain the following result:
Corollary 4 For any |I | ≥ 3, the set of defection-proof Nash equilibria under sincere
voting is nonempty.
4 Strategic voting
In this section, we analyze the case in which voters vote strategically. So now the two
stages of our model define a two-stage game. We first look for the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria of this two-stage game. Subsequently, we refine our predictions using
defection-proofness.
4.1 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
To define subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting, we need to con-
sider voters’ strategies in all possible Stage II subgames. Note that there are A|I | possi-
ble subgames in Stage II, one corresponding to each strategy profile of the politicians.
Definition 7 (Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting) The tuple of
strategy profiles
(
s, (vs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic
voting if for all s˜ ∈ A|I |, the voters’ strategy profile vs˜ is a Nash equilibrium in the
Stage II subgame following s˜ in Stage I, and the politicians’ strategy profile s is a
Nash equilibrium in the Stage I subgame given Stage II strategy profiles (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | .
Since every profile of voters’ strategies constitutes an equilibrium, for any choice of
strategies by the politicians s ∈ A|I | there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
such that all parties in P(s) are effective in equilibrium. This implies that any number
of effective parties between 1 and |I | and their configuration over the circle are possible
in subgame-perfectNash equilibriumunder strategic voting. In order to reduce the high
multiplicity of equilibria, we will use the notion of δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium which considers the possibility of coalitions of voters orchestrating
defections.
4.2 δ-Defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting will not be stable if there
exists a credible defection by either a coalition of politicians or voters. We there-
fore now restrict our attention to defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Defection-proofness in our two-stage game requires that there is no credible defection
by a coalition of players in either stage:
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1. Given Stage II strategy profiles (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | , the politicians’ strategy profile s is a
defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the Stage I subgame if there is no credible
defection from s by any coalition J ⊆ I .
2. The voter’s strategy profile vs in the Stage II subgame following s in Stage I is a
δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium if there is no credible δ-defection from vs .
Definition 8 (δ-Defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic
voting) The tuple of strategy profiles
(
s, (vs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
is a δ-defection-proof subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting if for all s˜ ∈ A|I |, the voters’ strategy
profile vs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the Stage II subgame following s˜
in Stage I, and the politicians’ strategy profile s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium
in the Stage I subgame given Stage II strategy profiles (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | .
It is clear that any δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic
voting is also a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting.
Our next result shows that defection-proofness sharply refines the set of subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria under strategic voting: Irrespective of the value of δ, any
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting with three or more effective
parties in equilibrium is not δ-defection-proof.
Theorem 5 Consider any δ ≤ 1. If (s, (vs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
is a δ-defection-proof subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting, then there are at most two effective
parties under vs .
In the proof,wefirst argue that δ-defection-proofNash equilibrium requires that almost
all voters vote sincerely in the Stage II subgames. If a positive proportion of the voters
do not vote sincerely, then an  proportion of them could switch their votes to their
most-preferred party, making it the unique effective party. This defection is credible
when  is sufficiently small since then any further defection by a proper subcoalition
of the voters will have no impact on the outcome. So suppose almost all voters are
voting sincerely and there are three or more effective parties. Pick any two adjacent
parties, P1 and P2, with P2 in the clockwise direction of P1. Due to the continuity
of the voter’s utility function, we can always find a positive proportion of the voters
located between these two parties and closer to P1 who prefer that P2 wins for sure
over a lottery in which a party that is even farther then P2 could gain power. Thus,
instead of voting sincerely, if an  proportion of these voters defect and vote for P2,
then P2 will become the unique effective party. For the same reason as mentioned
above, this defection is credible when  is sufficiently small.
We are unable to prove the existence of δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria under strategic voting when δ ≥ 0.5. However, it is more natural to consider
the case when the feasible coalitions of voters are small in size. Specifically, we restrict
attention to the case of δ < 0.5 (it is difficult to see how more than half the electorate
can come together to identify and agree upon a credible defection). In that case, we
have the following result:
Theorem 6 Let δ < 0.5.
(i) There exist δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibria under strategic
voting such that exactly one party is effective in equilibrium.
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(ii) There exist δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic
voting such that exactly two parties are effective in equilibrium. In such equilibria,
we can obtain any distribution of politicians over the two effective parties as well
as any distance between the pair of agendas supported by the two effective parties.
Thus, when δ is less than 0.5, the set of δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria under strategic voting is nonempty and can generate both one effective
party or two effective parties in equilibrium.
To construct the equilibrium with exactly one effective party, consider any politi-
cians’ strategy profile s such that all politicians support the same agenda a. In order to
ensure that no coalition of politicians have an incentive to defect from s, fix the voters’
strategy profiles in the Stage II subgames as follows: If a coalition of politicians switch
to supporting some agenda other than a, then the voters punish that coalition by con-
tinuing to vote for the remaining party which supports agenda a. This voters’ strategy
profile is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the Stage II subgame because, as
δ < 0.5 and all voters vote for the same party, no coalition of voters with measure at
most δ can change the outcome by defecting.
To construct the equilibrium with exactly two effective parties, consider any politi-
cians’ strategy profile s such that a subset of the politicians support agenda a while
the rest support agenda b. In order to ensure that no coalition of politicians have an
incentive to defect from s, fix the voters’ strategy profiles in the Stage II subgames as
follows: First, if a coalition of politicians in the party supporting one of the agendas,
say a, switch to supporting the other agenda b, then the voters punish that coalition
by voting only for the remaining party which supports a. Second, if a coalition of
politicians form a third party by supporting an agenda other than a or b, then again
the voters punish that coalition by voting only for the party supporting a. Again, since
δ < 0.5, these voters’ strategy profiles are δ-defection-proof subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in the respective Stage II subgames. Notice that this argument does not rely
on the distance between a and b, and on the size of the two parties supporting these
agendas. Thus, we conclude that the δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium under strategic voting does not place any restriction on (a) the agendas supported
by the two effective parties in equilibrium and (b) the distribution of politicians over
the two effective parties in equilibrium.
5 Relation to the linear model
It is interesting to contrast the defection-proof equilibria that we obtain in our circular
model to those we obtain when the space of agendas is the unit interval.
Sincere voting
When agendas are the unit interval, there are multiple Nash equilibria under sincere
voting with one or more effective parties in equilibrium. For instance, the politicians’
strategy profile in which all politicians choose the midpoint of the interval is obviously
a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting. To obtain multiple effective parties in equi-
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librium, pick any integer n such that 2 ≤ n ≤ |I |2 . Consider a partition {P1, . . . , Pn}
of I such that
∣
∣|Pk |− |Pk′ |∣∣ ≤ 1 for all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Now define the politicians’
strategy profile s by placing all politicians in Pk at 2k−12n distance from zero on the unit
interval. Then P(s) = {P1, . . . , Pn} and, due to sincere voting, all parties have equal
weight of 1n . Thus, all parties are effective. Since each party in P(s) has at least two
politicians, a deviation by a single politician to an agenda that is not supported in s will
ensure that the deviating politician gets zero utility.Moreover, since
∣
∣|Pk |−|Pk′ |∣∣ ≤ 1
for all k, k′, a deviation by a single politician to an agenda that is supported in s will
not increase her utility. Thus, s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting.
If we now apply defection-proofness, then there is a unique defection-proof Nash
equilibrium under sincere voting, which is the one in which all politicians choose
the midpoint of the interval. The Nash equilibrium in which all politicians choose
the midpoint is clearly defection-proof (and this is the only Nash equilibrium with
one effective party). To prove that there are no other defection-proof Nash equilibria,
consider any Nash equilibriumwithmultiple effective parties. Pick the left-most party,
which must be effective in equilibrium.19 Now, if all the politicians in this left-most
party move slightly to the right, then this party will increase its weight, and hence
become the only effective party. Moreover, it is easy to show that there is no further
defection by any subcoalition of these politicians. Hence, any Nash equilibrium under
sincere voting with more than one party is not defection-proof.
Strategic voting
If we now allow for strategic voting by the voters located on the unit interval, then
the results are almost the same as those for the case of the circular agenda space.
For the same reasons as before, any choice of strategies by the politicians with any
number of effective parties between 1 and |I | can be supported in subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium. Theorem 5 also holds verbatim for this model (the proof is identical
too). Thus, none of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria with three or more effective
parties are δ-defection-proof for any δ.
As in Theorem 6, when δ < 0.5, we can show that there exist both types of δ-
defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, viz., those in which only one party
is effective and those in which two parties are effective. Among the δ-defection-
proof subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which only one party is effective, the single
effective party can support any agenda on the line (the proof is identical to that of
Theorem 6(i)). However, unlike in the case of the circle, the distance between the
agendas supported by the two effective parties in a δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium cannot be arbitrary. This is because, when the voters’ strategy profile
in the Stage II subgame generatesmultiple effective parties, then such a strategy profile
is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in that subgame only if almost all voters vote
19 The reason for this is that no politician would like to stay in a party that is not effective in equilibrium.
The precise argument is similar to the one in Lemma 7.
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sincerely over the effective parties.20 As a result, if we have two effective parties in
equilibrium, and almost all voters must vote sincerely over these two parties, then the
two parties must be equidistant from the midpoint.
6 Summary
Our aim in this paper was to study whether Duverger’s Law can find game-theoretic
foundations in a spatial model of party formation and electoral competition. As the
standard model with a linear set of agendas has the tendency to drive politicians to
centrism, we instead adopt the unit circle as the set of agendas. For both sincere voting
and strategic voting, we find a large multiplicity of (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibria.
We use the notion of defection-proof Nash equilibrium to refine our predictions and
we find that defection-proofness refines in the direction predicted by Duverger’s Law:
Either two or three parties are effective under sincere voting while either one or two
parties are effective under strategic voting. However, these results are only partially
consistent with Duverger’s Law since there exist defection-proof Nash equilibria with
three parties under sincere voting and with one party under strategic voting.
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
7 Proofs: sincere voting
Proof of Theorem 1 We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas. unionsq
Lemma 7 If s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then all
parties in P(s) have equal weight.
Proof Suppose s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting with |P(s)| ≥ 2 but
there exists a P ∈ P(s) such that wP (s, v∗s ) < maxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s, v∗s ). Hence,
ρP (w(s, v∗s )) = 0 and ui (s, v∗s ) = 0 for all i ∈ P . Pick any politician i ∈ P
and party Pˆ ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s, v∗s ). Consider the strategy profile (s′i , s−i ) such
that s′i = aˆ, where aˆ is the agenda supported by Pˆ in s. Note that Pˆ ∪{i} ∈ P(s′i , s−i ).
If Pˆ∪{i} = argmaxP ′∈P(s′i ,s−i ) wP ′
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
, thenui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
> 0, a contradiction.
If not, then pick any Pˆ ′ ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s′i ,s−i ) wP ′
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
. Let aˆ′ be
the agenda supported by Pˆ ′ in (s′i , s−i ). Consider the strategy (s′′i , s−i ) such that
s′′i = aˆ′. The sets of agendas supported by the parties are the same in (s′i , s−i ) and
20 If this were not true, then a tiny proportion of voters could switch to their most-preferred effective party,
making it the unique effective party, and thereby increasing their utility. Moreover, this defection is credible
since the proportion of voters is tiny (a similar argument is made in Lemma 18).
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(s′′i , s−i ). Hence, Pˆ ′ ∪ {i} ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s′′i ,s−i ) wP ′
(
(s′′i , s−i ), v∗(s′′i ,s−i )
)
. Therefore,
ui
(
(s′′i , s−i ), v∗(s′′i ,s−i )
)
> 0, a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 8 If s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then for any
two adjacent parties P and P ′ in P(s), we have ls(P) = rs(P ′) and rs(P) = ls(P ′).
Furthermore, if |P(s)| is odd, then all parties are equidistant from each other.
Proof Let P and P ′ be two adjacent parties in P(s). Without loss of generality, let
P ′ = Ls(P). Hence, ls(P) = rs(P ′). By Lemma 7, P and P ′ have equal weight. So
rs(P) = ls(P ′).
Let P1 = P and Pk+1 = Rs(Pk) for k = 1, . . . , |P(s)|−1.Note that P |P(s)| = P ′.
If |P(s)| is odd, then we have rs(P1) = ls(P2) = rs(P3) = · · · = rs(P |P(s)|),
rs(P |P(s)|) = ls(P1) and ls(P1) = rs(P2) = ls(P3) = · · · = ls(P |P(s)|). Therefore,
all parties are equidistant from each other. unionsq
Lemma 9 If s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then we
have maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof Pick any P, P ′ ∈ P(s). Without loss of generality, let |P| > |P ′|+1. Consider
a politician i ∈ P . We have ui (s, v∗s ) = wP (s,v
∗
s )|P| . Let s
′
i = a′, where a′ is the
agenda supported by party P ′ in s. Since the sets of agendas supported in (s′i , s−i )
and s are the same, all parties formed in (s′i , s−i ) have equal weight (s is a Nash
equilibrium and Lemma 7). Furthermore, the weight of party P ′ ∪ {i} in the strategy
profile (s′i , s−i ) is equal to wP ′(s, v∗s ). Hence, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= wP ′ (s,v∗s )|P ′|+1 . But
wP (s, v∗s ) = wP ′(s, v∗s ), by Lemma 7. Therefore, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
> ui (s, v∗s ),
a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 10 A strategy profile s such that |P(s)| = 2 is a Nash equilibrium under
sincere voting if and only if the distance between the parties is more than 13 and
maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof Let s be a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting such that |P(s)| = 2. Then it
follows from Lemma 9 that maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1.
Let P(s) = {P, P ′}. Since |I | ≥ 3, at least one of the parties is not singleton.
Without loss of generality, let |P| > 1. Pick an i ∈ P . SincewP (s, v∗s ) = wP ′(s, v∗s ) =
1
2 , we have ui (s, v
∗
s ) ≤ 14 .
Let d = min{ls(P), rs(P)}. We call the arc between the agendas supported by
parties P and P ′ in s with length d as arc d, and the other arc as arc 1 − d (in case
d = 12 , then call any one of the two arcs defined by the agendas supported by P and
P ′ in s as arc d and the other as arc 1 − d).
Suppose d ≤ 13 . Let politician i deviate to s′i , which is the midpoint of arc
1 − d. In strategy profile (s′i , s−i ), there are three parties {i}, P\{i} and P ′. More-
over, w{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 1−d2 ≥ 13 whereas wP\{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
=
wP ′
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 1+d4 ≤ 13 . Hence, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
≥ 13 , a contra-
diction.
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To prove the other implication, suppose s is a strategy profile with P(s) = {P, P ′},
d > 13 and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1. Pick any i ∈ P . We have ui (s, v∗s ) = 12|P| .
Consider any deviation s′i by politician i . Now, two cases are possible:
(i) |P| > 1: Suppose s′i is an unsupported agenda on arc d. Then three parties
{i}, P\{i} and P ′ form in (s′i , s−i ). Moreover, w{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= d2
whereas, since d ≤ 12 , wP\{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
> 12 − d2 ≥ d2 . Hence,
ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 0. So i has no incentive to deviate from si to s′i .Next, sup-
pose s′i is an unsupported agenda on arc 1−d. Again, three parties {i}, P\{i} and P ′
form in (s′i , s−i ).Moreover,w{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 1−d2 but either P ′ or P\{i}
has a weight of at least 1+d4 >
1−d
2 since d >
1
3 . Hence, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
=
0 and i has no incentive to deviate from si to s′i . Finally, if s′i is the agenda sup-
ported by party P ′ in s, then ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 12(|P ′|+1) ≤ 12|P| since
|P| − |P ′| ≤ 1. So i has no incentive to make this deviation.
(ii) |P| = 1: As long as s′i is not the agenda supported by P ′, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
=
1
2 . If s
′
i is the agenda supported by P
′, then ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 1|P ′|+1 ≤ 13 .
So i has no incentive to deviate.
A similar argument can be made for any politician in party P ′. Hence, s is a Nash
equilibrium under sincere voting. unionsq
Lemma 11 A strategy profile s such that |P(s)| ≥ 3 and |I | ≥ 2|P(s)| is a Nash
equilibrium under sincere voting if and only if all parties in P(s) have equal weight
and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof Suppose strategy profile s is such that all parties have equal weight and
maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P|−|P ′| ≤ 1. Pick any P ∈ P(s) and i ∈ P . SincewP (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)| ,
we have ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)||P| . Furthermore, since |I | ≥ 2|P(s)|, we must have
|P ′| ≥ 2 for all P ′ ∈ P(s). Consider any deviation s′i by politician i . If s′i is an agenda
supported by some P ′ ∈ P(s), then the sets of agendas supported by the parties are
the same in s and (s′i , s−i ). Hence, all parties formed in (s′i , s−i ) have equal weight
and wP ′∪{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= wP ′(s, v∗s ). Therefore, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
=
1
|P(s)|(|P ′|+1) ≤ 1|P(s)||P| since |P| ≤ |P ′| + 1. If s′i is an agenda that is not supported
in strategy s, then there exists a P ′ ∈ P(s) such that s′i is between the agendas
supported by P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s. Hence, w{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= ls (P ′)2 . But
the weight of party R(s
′
i ,si )(P ′) in (s′i , s−i ) equals
ls (P ′)+rs (P ′)
2 (using the fact that
there are at least three parties in s and all these parties have equal weight). Hence,
ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 0, and therefore there is no incentive for her to deviate.
Lemmas 7 and 9 prove the other implication. unionsq
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Lemma 12 Under sincere voting, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium s such that
either (i) |P(s)| = 1 or (ii) |P(s)| > 6 and |I | < 2|P(s)|.
Proof Suppose s is such a Nash equilibrium. If |P(s)| = 1, then any politician i can
deviate to any s′i and obtain ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 12 > 1|I | = ui (s, v∗s ). Next, if
|P(s)| > 6 and |I | < 2|P(s)|, then there exists at least one party P ∈ P(s) such that
P = {i}. It follows from Lemma 7 that ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)| . Let P ′ be the closest party
adjacent to P in s. We know that |P ′| ∈ {1, 2} (Lemma 9). If politician i deviates
to s′i , which is the agenda supported by P ′ in s, then there are at most two parties
with the highest weight in (s′i , s−i ) and P ′ ∪ {i} is one of these two parties. Hence,
ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
≥ 12(|P ′|+1) ≥ 16 > 1|P(s)| , a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 13 The politicians’ strategy profile s such that 5 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 6 and
|I | < 2|P(s)| is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting if and only if all parties
are equidistant from each other, maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1, and there do not exist
P, P ′ ∈ P(s) such that P and P ′ are adjacent, and |P| = |P ′| = 1.
Proof Let s be such a Nash equilibrium. First, suppose that the parties are not equidis-
tant. It follows fromLemma 8 that |P(s)| = 6 and ls(P ′′) = rs(P ′′) for all P ′′ ∈ P(s).
Since |I | < 2|P(s)| there exists a party P ∈ P(s) such that P = {i}. Hence,
ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)| (Lemma 7). Let P ′ be the closest party adjacent to P in s. We
know that |P ′| ∈ {1, 2} (Lemma 9). If politician i deviates to s′i , which is the agenda
supported by P ′ in s, then the weight of party P ′∪{i} in (s′i , s−i ) is strictly greater than
any other party’s weight, and hence ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
≥ 13 > 16 , a contradiction.
Therefore, all parties in s are equidistant from each other.
Next, suppose that there are two adjacent parties P, P ′ ∈ P(s) such that |P| =
|P ′| = 1. Let P = {i}. Then ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)| (Lemma 7). If politician i deviates
to s′i , which is the agenda supported by P ′ in s, then there are exactly two parties in
(s′i , s−i ) with the highest weight and party P ′ ∪ {i} in (s′i , s−i ) is one of them. Hence,
ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 14 > 1|P(s)| , a contradiction.
Finally, we show the other implication. Let s satisfy the conditions listed in the
lemma. Pick any P ∈ P(s) and i ∈ P . Then |P| ≤ 2 and ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)||P| .
Consider any deviation s′i by politician i .
(i) Suppose |P| = 2: If s′i is an agenda supported by some P ′ ∈ P(s), then the
sets of agendas supported by the parties are the same in s and (s′i , s−i ). As a
result,wP ′∪{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= wP ′(s, v∗s ), and so ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
=
1
|P(s)|(|P ′|+1) ≤ 1|P(s)||P| since |P| ≤ |P ′| + 1. If s′i is an agenda that is
not supported by any party in strategy s, then there exists a P ′ ∈ P(s)
such that s′i is between the agendas supported by P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s. Hence,
w{i}
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= ls (P ′)2 . But the weight of party R(s
′
i ,si )(P ′) in (s′i , s−i )
equals l
s (P ′)+rs (P ′)
2 (using the fact that there are at least three parties in s and all
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these parties have equalweight). Hence, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 0, and therefore
there is no incentive for her to deviate.
(ii) Suppose |P| = 1: Let arc d ′ be the arc between the agendas supported by Ls(P)
and Rs(P) in s that does not contain si . If s′i is in arc d ′ but s′i is neither the
agenda supported by Ls(P) nor Rs(P) in s, then parties Ls(P) and Rs(P) are
also formed in strategy (s′i , s−i ) and at least one of them obtains a higher weight
than the party of politician i in (s′i , s−i ). Hence, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 0, and
therefore there is no incentive to deviate. If s′i is the agenda supported by Ls(P)
in s, then Ls(P)∪ {i} and Rs(P) form in strategy (s′i , s−i ) and obtain the highest
weight. Since |Ls(P)| = 2, we have ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 16 . Therefore, there
is no incentive to deviate. A similar argument works if s′i is the agenda supported
by Rs(P) in s. In the remaining case, ui
(
(s′i , s−i ), v∗(s′i ,s−i )
)
= 0 since both Ls(P)
and Rs(P) are also formed in strategy (s′i , s−i ) and at least one of them obtains a
higher weight than the party of politician i in (s′i , s−i ). Hence, there is no incentive
to deviate.
Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting. unionsq
Lemma 14 The politicians’ strategy profile s such that 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 4 and
|I | < 2|P(s)| is a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting if and only if all parties
are equidistant from each other and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P| − |P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 13.
The above lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas. unionsq
Lemma 15 Let s be such that |P(s)| ≥ 4. Then s is not a defection-proof Nash
equilibrium under sincere voting.
Proof Assume that s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium under sincere voting. Let
P(s) = {P1, . . . , Pn} such that n ≥ 4.Without loss of generality, let Pk+1 = Rs(Pk)
for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1 and ls(P3) ≤ rs(P3). Since s is a Nash equilibrium under
sincere voting, all parties in P(s) have equal weight. Therefore, ui (s, v∗s ) = 1|P(s)||Pk |
for all i ∈ Pk . Moreover, |P2| + |P3| ≤ 2|Pk | + 1 for k = 2, 3 (using Lemma 9).
Consider the arc between the agendas supported by P2 and P3 in s corresponding
to ls(P3). Let a be the midpoint of this arc. Consider the coalition J = P2 ∪ P3
and s′J such that s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Let s′ = (s′J , s−J ). Now, P(s′) = {P1, P2 ∪
P3, P4, . . . , Pn} and
ls
′
(P2 ∪ P3) = ls(P2) + ls (P3)2 = rs(P3) + r
s (P2)
2 = rs
′
(P2 ∪ P3).
Thus, the weight of P2∪ P3 in s′ equals ls(P2)+ ls (P3)2 . Now, rs
′
(P1) = ls′(P2∪ P3)
and ls
′
(P1) = ls(P1) = ls(P3) ≤ rs(P3) = ls(P2). Similarly, ls′(P4) = rs′(P2 ∪
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P3) and rs
′
(P4) ≤ rs(P3). Therefore, in s′, P2 ∪ P3 has a greater weight than both
P1 and P4. Clearly,wPk (s
′, v∗s′) = wPk (s, v∗s ) for all k > 4. Therefore, in s′, P2∪ P3
is the unique party with the maximum weight. Hence, u j (s′, v∗s′) = 1|P2|+|P3| for all
j ∈ J .
Since |P(s)||Pk | ≥ 4|Pk | > 2|Pk |+1 ≥ |P2|+|P3| for k = 2, 3, s′J is a defection
from s by J .
Consider any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J and let s′′J ′ be such that s′′j = a′ = a for all
j ∈ J ′′. Let s′′ = (s′′J ′, s′−J ′). If a′ lies on the arc between the agendas supported by
P1 and P4 in s′ that does not contain a, then party J\J ′ will be the unique party with
the maximum weight in s′′. Hence, the utility of each j ∈ J ′′ will be zero in s′′. In all
other cases, the new party J ′ will obtain a weight of l
s′ (P2∪P3)
2 , which is less than the
weight obtained by at least either P1 or P4 in s′′. Thus, the utility of each j ∈ J ′′ will
again be zero in s′′. So there does not exist any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J with a defection
from s′. Therefore, s′J is a credible defection from s by J , a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 16 Let s be a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting such that |P(s)| = 3.
Then s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium under sincere voting.
Proof Let P(s) = {P1, P2, P3}, J a coalition of politicians, and s′J a profile for this
coalition such that s j = s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Suppose s′J is a credible defection from
s by J . Consider the following cases:
(i) Pk\J = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Pick any j ∈ J and consider the strategy
profile (s′j , s− j ). Clearly the set of agendas supported in (s′J , s−J ) is equal
to the set of agendas supported in (s′j , s− j ). Therefore, the weight of party
supporting a in (s′J , s−J ) is equal to the weight of the party supporting a in
(s′j , s− j ). But the latter party is singleton. Thus, u j
(
(s′j , s− j ), v∗(s′j ,s− j )
)
≥
u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
> u j (s, v∗s ), a contradiction to the fact that s is a
Nash equilibrium.
(ii) P1 ⊆ J and Pk\J = ∅ for k = 2, 3. Then a is not supported by P1 in s. If
a is also not supported by P2 or P3 in s, then three parties form in (s′J , s−J )
but the weight of the party supporting a is less than the weight of at least one
other party. Thus, u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
= 0 for all j ∈ J , a contradiction.
If a is supported by, without loss of generality, P2, then P2 ∩ J = ∅. Now, two
parties form in (s′J , s−J ). Pick any j ∈ P1. Then u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
≤
1
2|P1|+2|P2| . On the other hand, u j (s, v
∗
s ) = 13|P1| . However, 3|P1| ≤ 2|P1| +
2|P2| because |P1| ≤ |P2|+1 ≤ 2|P2|. So s′J cannot be a defection. Similarly,
we can obtain contradictions when either:
(iii) P2 ⊆ J and Pk\J = ∅ for k = 1, 3, or
(iv) P3 ⊆ J and Pk\J = ∅ for k = 1, 2.
(v) P1 ∪ P2 ⊆ J and P3\J = ∅. Then a is not supported by both P1 and P2 in s.
If a is also not supported by P3 in s, then two parties form in (s′J , s−J ). Pick
any j ∈ P1. Then u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
≤ 1
2|P1|+2|P2| . On the other hand,
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u j (s, v∗s ) = 13|P1| . However, as above, 3|P1| ≤ 2|P1|+ 2|P2|. So s′J cannot be
a defection, a contradiction. If a is supported by P3, then P3 ∩ J = ∅. Now,
a single party is formed in (s′J , s−J ). However, since (s′J , s−J ) is not a Nash
equilibrium under sincere voting, there exists a credible defection by a single
politician, without loss of generality by j ∈ J , from (s′J , s−J ). Thus, (s′J , s−J )
is not a credible defection from s by J , a contradiction. We can similarly obtain
contradictions when either:
(vi) P1 ∪ P3 ⊆ J and P2\J = ∅, or
(vii) P2 ∪ P3 ⊆ J and P1\J = ∅.
(viii) P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 = J . A single party is formed after the defection, and hence the
resulting profile is not a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting. Thus, the initial
defection is not credible, a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 17 Let s be a Nash equilibrium under sincere voting such that |P(s)| = 2.
Then s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium under sincere voting.
Proof Let P(s) = {P1, P2}, J a coalition of politicians, and s′J a profile for this
coalition such that s j = s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Suppose s′J is a credible defection from
s by J . Consider the following cases:
(i) Pk\J = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, 2}. Pick any j ∈ J and consider the strategy profile
(s′j , s− j ). Clearly the set of agendas supported in (s′J , s−J ) is equal to the set of
agendas supported in (s′j , s− j ). Therefore, the weight of party supporting a in
(s′J , s−J ) is equal to theweight of the party supportinga in (s′j , s− j ). But the latter
party is singleton. Thus, u j
(
(s′j , s− j ), v∗(s′j ,s− j )
)
≥ u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
>
u j (s, v∗s ), a contradiction to the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) P1 ⊆ J and P2\J = ∅. Then a is not supported by P1 in s. If a is also
not supported by P2 in s, then two parties form in (s′J , s−J ). The weight
of the party supporting a is equal to 12 . Thus, for any j ∈ P1, we have
u j
(
(s′J , s−J ), v∗(s′J ,s−J )
)
≤ 1
2|P1| = u j (s, v∗s ), a contradiction. If a is supported
by P2, then P2 ∩ J = ∅. Now, a single party is formed in (s′J , s−J ). However,
since (s′J , s−J ) is not a Nash equilibrium, (s′J , s−J ) is not a credible defection
from s by J , a contradiction. We can similarly obtain a contradiction when:
(iii) P2 ⊆ J and P1\J = ∅.
(iv) P1∪P2 = J . A single party is formed after the defection, and hence the resulting
profile is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the initial defection is not credible, a
contradiction.
These lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem. unionsq
8 Proofs: strategic voting
Proof of Theorem 5: We first prove the following lemma:
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Lemma 18 Consider any δ ≤ 1. Under strategic voting, if vs is a δ-defection-proof
Nash equilibrium in the subgame following s in Stage I, then there are at most two
effective parties under vs .
Proof Consider the subgame following the strategy profile s of politicians. Suppose
there are three or more effective parties under vs . Let P1 be one such effective party.
Nowmove in clockwise direction from P1 and let P2 be the first party in that direction
that is also effective under vs . Let a be the midpoint between the agendas supported
by parties P1 and P2.
First, suppose there exists a positive measure of voters between the agenda sup-
ported by P1 and a that do not vote for P1 under vs . Pick a subset B of these voters
with measure  such that 0 <  ≤ δ. Let v′s be the strategy profile that results when
all voters in B switch their votes to P1 ceteris paribus. Under v′s , only party P1 is
effective. All voters in B are strictly better-off under v′s because among all parties that
are effective under vs , voters in B are closest to P1.
Suppose there exists a subset of voters C ⊂ B such that C has positive but smaller
measure than B and there is a defection from v′s by C . Call this defection v′′s . Since all
voters in C strictly prefer the agenda supported by P1 to any of the agendas supported
by other parties that are effective under vs , it must be that voters in C switch their
votes to a party say P3 that is not effective under vs but is effective under v′′s . However,
if  is sufficiently small, then it is impossible for party P3 to be effective under v′′s . To
see this, let wP1(s, v
′′
s ) and wP3(s, v
′′
s ) be the weights of, respectively, parties P1 and
P3 under v′′s . Similarly, let wP1(s, vs) and wP3(s, vs) be the weights of, respectively,
parties P1 and P3 under vs . Then
wP1(s, v
′′
s ) ≥ wP1(s, vs) > wP3(s, vs) and wP3(s, v′′s ) ≤ wP3(s, vs) + .
Thus, if  is small enough, we must have wP1(s, v
′′
s ) > wP3(s, v
′′
s ).
Second, suppose almost all voters between the agenda supported by P1 and a vote
for P1 under vs . The voter located at a is indifferent between the agendas supported by
P1 and P2 but strictly prefers both these agendas to those supported by other effective
parties under vs . Therefore, this voter will strictly prefer the agenda supported by P2
to the lottery over agendas generated under vs . As a result, a positive proportion of the
voters located beside a in the counterclockwise direction will also prefer the agenda
supported by P2 to the lottery over agendas generated under vs . Pick a subset B of
these voters with measure  such that 0 <  ≤ δ. Let v′s be the strategy profile that
results when all voters in B switch their votes to P2 ceteris paribus. Under v′s , only
party P2 is effective. Moreover, all voters in B are strictly better-off under v′s .
Suppose there exists a subset of voters C ⊂ B such that C has positive but smaller
measure than B and there is a defection from v′s by C . Call this defection v′′s . If all
voters in C switch their votes to a party say P3 that is not effective under vs but is
effective under v′′s , then like above, we can argue that if  is sufficiently small, then it
is impossible for party P3 to be effective under v′′s . Thus, if v′′s is a defection from v′s
by C , then it must be that all voters in C switch their votes from P2 to a party that is
effective under vs . But all these voters strictly prefer the agenda supported by P2 to the
agendas supported by all parties that are effective under vs except party P1. Hence, it
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must be that all voters in C switch their votes to party P1. But in vs , all voters in C are
voting for party P1 and wP1(s, vs) = wP2(s, vs). Since C has a smaller measure than
B, we must have wP1(s, v
′′
s ) < wP2(s, v
′′
s ). So party P1 cannot be effective under v
′′
s .
Thus, we have argued that there exists credible δ-defection from vs . Hence, vs is
not a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the subgame following s in Stage I. unionsq
The theorem follows from the above lemma since δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium requires the voters’ strategy profiles to be δ-defection-proof Nash
equilibria in the respective Stage II subgames. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 6 First, we show that there exists a δ-defection-proof subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium
(
s, (vs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
such that exactly one party is effective under
vs . Consider any Stage I strategy profile s such that all politician choose the same
agenda a, and hence P(s) = {P}. For all s˜, define vs˜ as follows:
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| = 1. Then vs˜ is such that all voters vote for the single party in
P(s˜). Of course, then vs˜ is the unique δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in this
subgame.
• s˜ is such that P(s˜) is not singleton and there exists a party in P ′ ∈ P(s˜) that
supports a. Then vs˜ is such that all voters vote for party P ′. Since δ < 0.5, it is
impossible for a coalition of voters of measure at most δ to switch their votes an
make another party in P(s′) effective. Hence, there is no δ-defection from vs˜ . So
vs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the subgame following s˜.
• s˜ is such that P(s˜) is not singleton and there does not exist a party in P(s˜) that
supports a. Then let vs˜ be such that all voters vote for a single party in P(s˜) – the
single party can be chosen arbitrarily. Again, since δ < 0.5, vs˜ is a δ-defection-
proof Nash equilibrium in the subgame following s˜. unionsq
Wenowargue that s is a defection-proofNash equilibrium in the Stage I subgame given
the Stage II strategy profiles (vs˜)s˜∈A|I | . Any defection by a coalition J of politicians
either leads to a strategy profile s′ such that |P(s′)| = 1or |P(s′)| = 2.When |P(s′)| =
1, all politicians’ utilities remain the same both before and after the deviation. Hence,
there is no such defection. When |P(s′)| = 2, then there exists a party P ′ ∈ P(s′) that
supports a. Hence, according to vs′ defined above, the deviating politicians get zero
utility under s′. Therefore, there is no such defection.
The above arguments imply that
(
s, (vs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
is a δ-defection-proof subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium under strategic voting.
Second, we show that there exists a δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium
(
sˆ, (vˆs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
such that exactly two parties are effective under vˆsˆ . Consider
any Stage I strategy profile sˆ such that some politicians choose some agenda a while
the rest choose another agenda b = a. Then P(sˆ) = {P1, P2}, where P1 is the set
of politicians choosing a and P2 is choosing b (notice that we make no assumption
regarding the size of P1 and P2). Let vˆsˆ be such that almost all voters vote sincerely
over the two parties in P1 and P2. For all s˜ = sˆ, define vˆs˜ as follows:
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| = 1. Then vˆs˜ is such that all voters vote for the single party in
P(s˜). Of course, then vˆs˜ is the unique δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in this
subgame.
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• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| = 2 and a is supported by party Pa while b is supported
by party Pb in P(s˜) such that P1 ⊂ Pa . Then Pb ⊂ P2. Then let vˆs˜ be such
that all voters vote for Pb. Since δ < 0.5, it is impossible for a coalition of
voters of measure at most δ to switch their votes and make a party other than Pb
effective. Hence, there is no δ-defection from vˆs˜ . So vˆs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash
equilibrium in the subgame following s˜.
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| = 2 and a is supported by party Pa while b is supported
by party Pb in P(s˜) such that P2 ⊂ Pb. Then Pa ⊂ P1. Then let vˆs˜ be such
that all voters vote for Pa . Since δ < 0.5, it is impossible for a coalition of
voters of measure at most δ to switch their votes and make a party other than Pa
effective. Hence, there is no δ-defection from vˆs˜ . So vˆs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash
equilibrium in the subgame following s˜.
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| = 2 and s˜ does not fall into the previous two cases. Then
let vˆs˜ be such that almost all voters vote sincerely over the two parties in P(s˜). If
there is a δ-defection from vˆs˜ , then it must be that a measurable subset of voters
B switch their votes from one party in P(s˜) to the other. But as almost all voters
vote sincerely in vˆs˜ , such a switch in votes by the voters in B will ensure that only
that party which almost all voters in B find less desirable is effective. Hence, there
is no δ-defection from vˆs˜ . So vˆs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in the
subgame following s˜.
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| ≥ 3 and both a and b are supported by some parties in P(s˜).
Suppose a is supported by party P ′ ∈ P(s˜). Then let vˆs˜ be such that all voters
vote for P ′. Since δ < 0.5, it is impossible for a coalition of voters of measure
at most δ to switch their votes and make a party other than P ′ effective. Hence,
there is no δ-defection from vˆs˜ . So vˆs˜ is a δ-defection-proof Nash equilibrium in
the subgame following s˜.
• s˜ is such that |P(s˜)| ≥ 3 and either a or b is not supported by a party in P(s˜).
Then let vˆs˜ be such that all voters vote for any single party in P(s˜) – the single
party can be chosen arbitrarily. Again, since δ < 0.5, vˆs˜ is a δ-defection-proof
Nash equilibrium in the subgame following s˜.
We nowargue that sˆ is a defection-proofNash equilibrium in the Stage I subgame given
the Stage II strategy profiles (vˆs˜)s˜∈A|I | . Any defection by a coalition J of politicians
leads to a strategy profile s′ such that one of the following is true:
1. |P(s′)| = 1. Then after the deviation by coalition J , all politicians get a utility
of 1|I | . If |J | = 1, then the deviation cannot be improving for the single deviating
politician as her utility goes down from 12 to
1
|I | . Hence, there is no such defection
from sˆ. If |J | ≥ 2, then the defection by J is not credible since a single politician
from J can further deviate to a new agenda and, according to (vˆs˜)s˜∈A|I | , increase
her utility from 1|I | to
1
2 .
2. |P(s′)| = 2. Suppose both a and b are supported by parties in P(s′). Then the
defection by J involves a switch by these politicians from one party inP(s) to the
other. Without loss of generality, suppose politicians in J switch from supporting
agenda a to agenda b. Then, according to vˆs′ defined above for this case, only
that party in P(s′) which supports agenda a will be effective. Hence, none of the
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politicians in J will increase her utility after this deviation. So there is no such
defection from sˆ.
Suppose only one of a or b is supported by a party in P(s′). Without loss of
generality, suppose only a is supported by a party in P(s′). Then the deviation by
J involves all politicians in P2 switching to another agenda. But, according to vˆs′
defined above for this case, both parties in P(s′) will be effective. Hence, none of
the politicians in P2 will increase her utility after this deviation. Therefore, there
is no such defection from sˆ.
3. |P(s′)| = 3. In this case, both a and b are supported by parties in P(s′). Then the
deviation by J involves some politicians switching to an agenda other than a or
b. But then, according to vˆs′ defined above for this case, the deviating politicians
will get zero utility after the deviation. Therefore, there is no such defection from
sˆ.
The above arguments imply that
(
sˆ, (vˆs˜)s˜∈A|I |
)
is a δ-defection-proof subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium. unionsq
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